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TAKING THE "BYTE" OUT OF
WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
Isn't it time that our industry grew up and just resisted purchasing
an expensive piece of computer software for which the warranty reads
in part:
All ... computer programs are distributed on an "as is" basis
without warranty of any kind. The entire risk as to the quality and
performance of such programs is with the purchaser. Should the
programs prove defective ... the purchaser and not the manufacturer ... assumes the entire cost of all necessary servicing or repair. [The company] shall have no liability or responsibility to a
purchaser....
This is not mere legal jargon. It's the embodiment of a business
philosophy which seriously harms all of us. It encourages sloppy work
and inadequate testing, and it increases the potential for dishonesty. Is
it any wonder that so many ... are turned off by computers?
To software companies I say: Accept responsibility for your products. Get the bugs out before you sell them. Don't try to sell a program debugged by your customers as a "revised" or improved product
at additional cost.
To software consumers I say: If possible, avoid products for which
there is no warranty. Don't buy on faith. Complain loudly to software
companies which provide no warranty. 1
The preceding letter from a distraught consumer reflects the increasing disenchantment retail purchasers experience when buying programs for their home computers. Given the way such programs are
marketed, such disenchantment is not surprising. Programs for home
computers are commonly sold at retail in "blister packs" (shrink
wrapped packages). Visible inside these packages is a sheet of paper
that sets forth a number of legal conditions that often disclaim all warranties and potential damages. 2 The paper also states that the opening
1. Letter from John Navas II to Byte Magazine (May 1982, at 16).
2. Atari, one of the most popular of the home computer program manufacturers, includes a provision which states:
Disclaimer of Warranty on ATARI Home Computer Programs: All ATARI
Home Computer Programs . . . are distributed on an "as is" basis without warranty of any kind. Any statements concerning the capabilities or utility of the
Computer Programs are not to be construed as express or implied warranties.
The entire risk as to the quality and performance of such Programs is with the

purchaser. Should a Program fail to fulfill the individual requirements of the
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of the blister pack constitutes acceptance of all of conditions it sets
forth. Thus, if a purchaser chooses to use a program, he does so at his
own risk.
The disclaimer of all liability for defects in programs is not surprising. Firms that market software are aware of the potentially enormous
damages that could result from the failure of their products. 3 Additionally, the commercial nature of the market in which computers were
originally sold, with a more balanced bargaining position between buyers and sellers, fostered the development of such disclaimers. As the
products have become more affordable, however, the market has expanded, and computers and programs have become common household
purchases. 4 By continuing to attempt to shield themselves from all liability, computer vendors have apparently failed to take note of the legal
significance of their movement into the retail consumer market. In this
environment, the vendors must comply not only with commercial laws,
but also with consumer laws and a strong public policy favoring consumer protection. Therefore, in the consumer context, the courts are
more likely to protect the consumer faced with such disparate bargaining power.
This Note will examine the legal actions available to the purchaser
of a defective home computer program, in essence focusing upon the extent to which these warranty disclaimers are valid and enforceable.
The existing bodies of contract and tort law, to some extent, give courts
the power to protect the consumer. This Note will analyze how the
courts, through these bodies of law, can offer protection to the consumer, and will conclude by proposing further equitable steps necessary
in this expanding market.
purchaser or prove defective following its purchase, the purchaser (and not the
manufacturer, distributor or retailer) assumes the entire cost of all servicing,
damages, or liabilities which may result from the use of any such Computer Program.

ATARI shall have no liability or responsibility to the original consumer purchaser or any other person or entity with respect to any claim, loss, liability, or
damage caused or alleged to be caused directory or indirectly by Computer Pro-

grams sold by ATARI. This disclaimer includes, but is not limited to, any interruption of services, loss of business or anticipatory profits, and/or incidental or
consequential damages resulting from the purchase, use, or operation of ATARI
Home Computer Programs.
3. See infra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Note, Negligence: Liabilityfor Defective Software, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 848

(1980) ("The computer has come of age in the land of the consumer."); Comment, Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439, 453 (1983)
("[B]oth industry and public opinion now look on computer programs as a commodity to
be bought and sold like a cassette tape or hair dryer.").
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I. BACKGROUND

In order to better understand the need for adequate consumer protection in the purchase of computer programs, a brief background on
the development of computer hardware and software is necessary.
A computer is designed to accept various types of input, or data,
and to manipulate or process that input in accordance with specified instructions in order to produce useful information. 5 Software programs
are the instructions that tell the computer component, or hardware,
6
what to do.
Software is an algorithm or formula which is sold to a home user as
a pre-packaged program embodied on a physical medium, often a cartridge. As a product of human intellect, software is subject to human
errors and limitations. If the program is improperly designed, the computer will not function as intended. Hence, the often-used expression
of computer programmers, "garbage in, garbage out," has merit.
One writer has noted that there are four principal points in a program's development when an error can be introduced: "first, when the
algorithm is constructed; second, when the algorithm is translated into
a higher level language; third, when the source program is translated by
the compiler into machine language; and fourth, when the object pro' '7
gram actually enters the machine by setting internal switches.
Although specific programs can be tested to reveal such errors, "no
amount of testing can guarantee that all the bugs in the program have
been found." 8 Indeed, computer programs have already caused near catastrophes that would have brought grave societal consequences. 9
Of course, defects in programs designed for home use would not
cause such devastating societal effects. Typically, home computer users
purchase programs that will assist them in maintaining personal and
business financial records, mailing lists and correspondence, preparing
tax returns, regulating the home's heating and air conditioning, and
other similar functions. Defects in such programs have less potential
for enormous consequential damages.' 0 Even though consumers' claims
5. Zammit, Contractingfor Computer Periodicials,56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 214 (1982).
6. Id.
7. Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.

173, 183 (1981).
8. Id. at 185 n.35.
9. See id. at 173. The author documents incidents of computer failures causing pas-

senger jets to almost collide, nuclear power plants to close, Skylab to suffer an alarming
waste of fuel during its descent, and a false alert of another world war.
10. In home computer contexts, there still is the potential in some cases for damages
to be severe. For example, one author suggests a foreseeable hypothetical wherein defect
in a program controlling the humidity within the home causes the humidifier to fill the
house with excess moisture, thereby damaging it. See Note, supra note 4, at 848. See also
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will generally tend to be smaller in size, they will nonetheless occur,
and the purchaser should be adequately protected. Additionally, "the
principle of the thing" is often as important to consumers as the actual
damages suffered.
II.

EXISTING LAW

The disgruntled consumer has two broad avenues he may pursue in
order to obtain remedies after purchasing an unwarranted defective
computer program. Contract and tort law both offer the consumer in
this situation some degree of protection. This section analyzes each of
these avenues.
A.
1.

CoNTRAcTs

The Uniform Commercial Code

a. Applicability of the Code: Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (hereinafter "U.C.C.") applies to "transactions in goods"" and defines "goods" as "all things. . . which are movable at the time of identification to the contract."'1 2 This statute has been substantially adopted
in every state, except Louisiana, as well as in the District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands. 13 If the contract is for the performance of services, then only the common law of contracts of the individual state
would apply.
The question of whether computer programs are goods for the purpose of U.C.C. coverage must be examined. This question is difficult,
for by exhibiting characteristics of both concrete property and abstract
knowledge, computer programs do not fit easily into either of the contract law's traditional categories of goods or services. A program is in
essence intangible intellectual property. These ideas, however, must be
given tangible form, and this transformation allows the inference that
the "ideas" have been made into "movable" goods.
Few courts have been presented with the question of whether programs should be considered goods for the purpose of U.C.C. coverage.
The two leading cases have reached opposite conclusions.
In 1970, in Computer Service Centers, Inc. v. Beacon Manufacturing
Co., 14 the United States District Court in South Carolina was first
presented with the question. The judge concluded that the contract in
Climate Control Malfunction Annihilates LaboratoryMice, Computerworld, Sept. 8, 1980,
at 10, col. 3.
11. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1976).
12. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1976).
13. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS).

14. 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970).
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15
The
question was one for services and thus not covered by the U.C.C.

facts specific to the case, the court's rationale, and the relative novelty
of the industry at the time all tend to support the court's conclusion.
Under the contract, Computer Service Centers agreed to furnish
data processing services to Beacon. Indeed, the written proposal for the
6
agreement explicitly stated that the contract was for services,' and the
payment under the contract was said to be for "the analysis, collection,
17
storage, and reporting of certain data" by Computer Service Centers.
The court concluded that this contract was for the sale of services proCenters, "and to claim to the contrary
vided by Computer Service
8
strains the imagination."'
In 1978, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York was presented with the same question and reached an oppo9
site conclusion in Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.' In
that case, the plaintiff corporation had agreed to have the defendant
computer system vendor install a system at Triangle's place of business.
The system was to include software prepared by the defendant for the
plaintiff's business. The court, in concluding that the software was a
"good" covered by the U.C.C., stated:
The agreement with Honeywell did not contemplate that it would run
a data processing service for Triangle but rather that Honeywell would
develop a completed system and deliver it .

.

. to Triangle to operate.

After the installation and training period, Honeywell personnel were to
withdraw, and Honeywell's major remaining obligation was to be maintenance. Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom
designed software remained Honeywell's intellectual property, Triangle
was purchasing the product of those concepts. That product required
and ... is more
efforts to produce, but it was a product nevertheless
20

readily characterized as "goods" than "services."
It appears from these cases that courts will look to specific factual
situations to determine whether the agreement was for a continuing
service or for an outright purchase of a program.
Applying this analysis in the consumer context, it seems appropriate to conclude that courts would consider pre-packaged programs that
2
have become such popular retail items in the past few years ' as goods
covered by the U.C.C. Such programs are distributed in a method simi15. Id. at 655.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
20. Id. at 769.
21. See Bride, Hardware Vendors See Software as the Difference, SOFTWARE NEWS,
May 3, 1982, at 37; Bylinsky, The Computer Stores Have Arrived, FORTUNE, Apr. 24, 1978,
at 52; The Computer BargainBasement is Here, MIS WEEK, July 8, 1981, at 4; What Xerox
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lar to the mass distribution of any product. The objective with such
programs is not to design them with individual users in mind, but
rather to sell the same programs as off-the-shelf "goods" to as many
users as possible. The commentators who have discussed this issue all
agree that these pre-packaged programs should undoubtedly be considered "goods" covered by the U.C.C. 22

Some analogize the "hybrid"

characteristics of both intellectual and tangible property of these pro23
grams to books and records, both of which are covered by the U.C.C.
For purposes of this Note, therefore, it will be assumed that computer
24
programs are within the scope of the U.C.C.

b. Warranty protection offered under the U.CC: A person who is
injured, either economically or physically, by a defective product has
three possible warranties under the U.C.C. by which he may recover
damages: an express warranty, an implied warranty of merchantability,
and an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
If the seller makes a promise or affirmation of fact about goods
which becomes part of the basis of the bargain, the seller has made an
express warranty that the goods conform to the promise or affirmation.25 Therefore, in order for the injured party to recover in a cause of
action for breach of express warranty, the seller must have taken some
express action to create such a warranty. In pre-packaged programs,
however, the manufacturer does not purport to make any such warranty. To the contrary, the manufacturer specifically and conspicuously
states that the product is being distributed without an express warranty, and, further, that no statements concerning the capabilities of the
product should be construed as an express warranty. 26 Thus, the consumer is prevented from claiming breach of an express warranty.
Implied warranties exist regardless of any overt claims that may or
may not be made by the seller. The U.C.C. offers two implied warranties as protection for the purchaser of a product. First, if the seller is a
merchant with respect to the goods, an implied warranty of
merchantability arises, warranting that the goods are fit for the ordiSees in Retail Stores, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1980, at 130; Pac-Man Invasion, Washington Post,
May 23, 1982, at B1, col. 4.
22. See Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS COM-

PUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (1979); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the UC.C., 77
MICH. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (1979); Note, supra note 4, at 854; Comment, supra note 4, at 444.
23. See, e.g., Note, Computer Programsas Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MICH. L. REV.,
1149, 1155, 1165 (1979).
24. The reader interested in a comparison of common law contracts and the U.C.C.,
and how these differences may affect litigation regarding computer programs, is referred
to Nycum, supra note 22, where this subject is explored in detail.
25. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978).
26. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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nary purposes for which buyers use such goods.2 The second implied
warranty offered by the U.C.C. is the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. 28 This warranty is created if the seller knows the
purpose for which the buyer requires the goods and knows that the
buyer is relying on the seller to furnish suitable goods for this purpose.
c. Effect of disclaimers of implied warranties and consequential
damages under the U.CC: On their face, implied warranties appear to
afford the buyer very basic and broad protection. He is guaranteed that
products must be of acceptable quality for normal use as well as for a
particular use when purchased under prescribed conditions. The impact
of both implied warranties offered by the U.C.C. is severely weakened,
however, by the seller's right to make disclaimers. U.C.C. § 2-316 explicitly authorizes disclaimers of implied warranties, but delineates specific requirements and circumstances necessary to create a valid
disclaimer. For instance, subsection (2) identifies the general standard
required for such disclaimers by providing that a written disclaimer of
the merchantability warranty must be conspicious and include the term
"merchantability." 29
In addition to disclaiming warranties, sellers of pre-packaged computer programs frequently disclaim consequential damages 3° in their
contracts. 31 U.C.C. § 2-719(3) allows such disclaimers so long as the limitation or exclusion is not unconscionable. The section specifically addresses the consumer by providing:
"Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."'3 2 The official comment to this clause states that terms
excluding consequential damages are merely an allocation of unknown
or undeterminable risks, and that the seller is free to disclaim warran33
ties under U.C.C. § 2-316.
d. Unconscionabilityas a bar to warranty disclaimers and limitations of damages: Generally, if disclaimers of implied warranties and
exclusions of consequential damages are conspicuous and meet the
27.
28.
29.
30.

U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.

§ 2-314 (1978).
§ 2-315 (1978).
§ 2-316(2) (1978).
§ 2-715(2) (1978) defines consequential damages resulting from the seller's

breach to include: "(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and

needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
31. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

32. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978).
33. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1978).
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U.C.C.'s disclaimer requirements,34 they will be upheld to shield the
seller from liability. While computer program disclaimers typically satisfy these requirements, U.C.C. § 2-302 gives the courts the power to
find such clauses unconscionable by providing:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
application
5
3

result.

Unconscionability can be either procedural or substantive, or a
combination of both. 36 Substantive unconscionability relates to the content of the agreement. Courts examine whether the terms of the contract are one-sided, or deprive a party of an essential element of the
is concerned with the relative
bargain.3 7 Procedural unconscionability
38
bargaining power of the parties.
Although the consumer arena has been the most fertile for the development of the doctrine of unconscionability, it is not easily applied
and is often confined to disadvantaged consumers in installment sale
contexts.3 9 Courts are, however, becoming increasingly more liberal in
their application of the doctrine. For example, in a recent case brought
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, warranty disclaimers and the exclusion of consequential damages
were found unconscionable in contracts for the acquisition of computer
hardware and software in a commercial context.40 Judge Schwazer, in
issuing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remarked:
[Tihis is perhaps a classic case of protecting a purchaser who is innocent of an appreciation of the consequences of a deficiency . ..a purchaser who has no experience in computers doesn't have any inkling of
. ..how wrong things go.

.

. so it seems to me if there is ever a reason

for holding that these provisions in these contracts should not be 41enforced because of unconscionability, this is the A-number-one case.
34. U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719(3) (1978).
35. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978). Although California has not adopted this particular provision, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 .(West 1983) allows the same result.
36. See, e.g., Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d
980, 989, 408 N.E.2d 403, 409-10 (1980).
37. WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 13, §§ 4-7, at 9-21.
38. Id. Courts may base a finding, for example, on gross economic disparity, potential
unfair surprise, or deceptive sales practice. Id. § 4-3, at 150-55.
39. Id. at § 4-2, at 149.
40. Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., No. C-79-3393(N.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 684 F.2d 658
(9th Cir. 1982).
41. Id., slip. op. at 6-7. But see Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 205, 343
N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (the court found "nothing unconscionable as far as the
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To summarize, absent a finding of unconscionability, the U.C.C. allows manufacturers to escape liability for defective products by disclaiming implied warranties and excluding consequential damages with
regard to their products. Unless state or federal legislation deviates
from the U.C.C., it is up to the courts to determine whether such disclaimers are unconscionable and, as such, unenforceable.
2. Federal and State Deviationfrom the U.C.C.
Recent federal and state legislation has restricted, and in some
cases abolished, traditional warranty defenses provided by the U.C.C.
This section will discuss where such deviation occurs and what effect it
has on warranty disclaimers.
a. Federal legislation: The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act ("the Act"), 42 enacted in 1975, is
the first federal regulation in the field of warranty law. It reflects an
attempt by Congress to facilitate private enforcement of warranty
rights of consumers by creating a right of action that is more generous
43
than that offered by the U.C.C.
The Act applies to purchasers of "consumer products,"'44 defining
that term to mean "any tangible personal property which is distributed
in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes.'' 4 Since it has already been assumed for purposes of
this Note that the shrink-wrapped, pre-written programs are tangible
goods, 46 it is further assumed that computer programs will be covered
under the Act provided that they are normally used for personal, family
or household purposes. Among the products covered by the Act are
those products that are used in both personal and commercial settings,
such as typewriters. 47 Where the Act is unclear as to whether an item
agreement between [the] partners" since the clause limiting liability was common to commercial agreements).
42. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1974).
43. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Miller & Kanter, Litigation Under MagnusonMoss: New Opportunitiesin Private Actions, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 10 (1980).

44. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1982).
45. Id.
46. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. Further, it can be argued from the
low purchase price that the consumer is buying a product that is being sold as a "tangible
good" rather than a service. The relatively low cost of each program (the average cost
ranges from $20-$100) is only worth a fraction of the value that the intellectual property
is worth to the developer.
47. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (1984).
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is covered, there is a presumption in favor of coverage. 48 It seems clear,
therefore, that programs purchased for home computer use would be
covered by the Act, even though they can also be used in commercial
settings.
The Act expands the number of forums available to the aggrieved
consumer by allowing him to bring actions under the Act in both state
and federal courts. 49 In order to maintain federal court jurisdiction,
however, at least $50,000 must be in controversy.50
The Act was primarily intended to regulate the content and effect
of written warranties for consumer products. 5 ' The Act does not require that consumer products be warranted. 52 Therefore, even though
the Act contains provisions limiting the use of disclaimers, most computer program manufacturers are able to circumvent the Act's dis53
claimer restrictions by refusing to make warranties of any kind.
The Act distinguishes between full and limited warranties, and sets
out the minimum requirements of such warranties.5 If a warrantor offers a full written warranty, 55 then it "may not impose any limitation
on the duration of any implied warranty of the product. ' 56 Moreover,
the supplier may not disclaim or modify any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to the product.5 7 Therefore, if a manufacturer purports to make a full warranty, it is then prohibited under the terms of
the Act from disclaiming implied warranties of any kind.
If a manufacturer makes a limited warranty 8s or any written warranty that is not a full warranty under the Act, then, while the supplier
may still not disclaim or modify any implied warranty to a consumer
48. Id.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1982).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3) (1982).
51. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) (1982).
53. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1982). This section provides:
(1) If a written warranty meets the Federal minimum standards for warranty set forth in [section 2304 of this title], then it shall be conspicuously designated a "full (statement of duration) warranty."
(2) If the written warranty does not meet the Federal minimum standards
for warranty set forth in [section 2304], then it shall be conspicuously designated
a "limited warranty."
55. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1982). In order to label a warranty a "full warranty," the supplier or seller must stand behind the product by agreeing to fix or replace defective parts
at no cost and by granting the consumer an option of either a replacement or a full refund
where the consumer's product cannot be fixed satisfactorily after a reasonable number of
attempts. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1982).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1982).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1982).
58. See supra note 54.
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with respect to the product, he may limit the duration of the implied
warranty to "the duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration,
if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in clear and unmistak5' 9
able language and prominently displayed on the face of the warranty.
The Act further provides that any purported disclaimer or limitation of
implied warranties in violation of the statute is ineffective for purposes
of federal and state law.6°
The House Report that accompanied the legislation stated that the
purpose of the implied warranty provision was to eliminate the situation where "the paper operated to take away from the consumer the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness arising by operation of
6
law and leaving little in its stead." '
The Act requires disclosure of any legal remedies available to the
consumer in the contents of a written warranty. 62 It does permit, however, in both full and limited warranties, exclusions or limitations of
consequential damages for breach of any written or implied warranties,
so long as such exclusions or limitations appear conspicuously on the
face of the warranty. 63 Thus, the Act basically leaves the treatment of
consequential damages to state law. The changes introduced by the Act
impose obligations in cases where the warrantor fails to conspicuously
disclose any exclusion or where the warrantor, subject to the implied
warranty obligations under the Act, fails to exclude consequential damages for breach of implied warranties. If properly made, however, exclusions of consequential damages remain valid and enforceable under
the Act.
It is apparent that the Act does limit a manufacturer's ability to disclaim implied warranties of both merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Such limitations, however, take effect only when
written warranties accompany the sale. Since most computer program
manufacturers do not purport to offer any written warranties, and in
fact specifically negate such warranties with regard to their programs, 6 4
the Act as it stands has no force or effect with regard to their
disclaimers.
The Act preempts the U.C.C. and other state laws by providing that
a "disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in violation of this sec'6 5
tion shall be ineffective for purposes of this title and State law."
59. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a), (b) (1982).

60. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (1982).
61. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEWS 7702, 7706.
62.
63.
64.
65.

15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(9) (1982).
15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(3), 2302(a)(6) (1982).
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (1982).
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States can, however, expand their own statutes to further protect the
consumer. The Act does not "invalidate or restrict any right or remedy
of any consumer under State law." 6
b. State legislation: Eleven states preclude disclaimers and modification of warranties and limit or preclude the exclusion of remedies to
a greater extent than does the U.C.C. These states are Alabama, California, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
In 1966, nine years before the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss
Act, Alabama became the first state to respond to the disclaimer problem with legislation. It added provisions to U.C.C. § 2-31667 and U.C.C.
§ 2-71968 prohibiting sellers from limiting or excluding liability for damages for personal injuries resulting from defective consumer goods. Alabama's approach fails, however, to address problems presented by
property and other economic losses caused by consumer goods. 69 Alabama's code affects disclaimers of express warranties and implied war70
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
In 1971, California approached the problem of disclaimer abuse by
enacting separate consumer statutes, rather than by amending the
U.C.C. 7 1 California's legislation, known as the "Song-Beverly

Con-

sumer Warranty Act,"'72 closely parallels the Magnuson-Moss Act in
that it primarily regulates the contents of written warranties. It does
not, however, provide consumers with sufficient protection from warranty disclaimers. If the manufacturer or dealer fails to make a written
warranty, then implied warranties may be disclaimed so long as the
warrantor informs the buyer that the goods are being sold on an "as is"
basis in accordance with section 1792.4. 73 If the manufacturer makes a
written warranty, then implied warranties may not be disclaimed, 7 4 but
if the duration of the express warranty is limited, implied warranties
66. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1982).
67. ALA. CODE § 7-02-316(5) (1977).
68. Id. § 7-02-719.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 7-02-316(5).
71. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1794.2 (West 1983).
72. Id. § 1790.
73. Id. § 1792.3. Section 1792.4 provides that the "as is" disclaimer will be effective to
disclaim implied warranties if the writing is clear and conspicuous to the consumer prior
to the sale, and contains each of the following statements: (1) the goods are being sold "as
is"; (2) the risk as to quality and performance is with the buyer; and (3) should the good
prove defective, the buyer assumes all necessary servicing and repair costs. Most computer program disclaimers meet these requirements.
74. Id. § 1793.
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are limited to the duration of the express warranty.7 5
The Kansas Consumer Protection Act 76 was enacted, in part, "to
protect consumers from unbargained for warranty disclaimers. '7 7 The
Kansas Act prohibits disclaimers of implied warranties or limitation of
remedies by any party in the chain of distribution. 78 It does, however,
allow a seller to limit the implied warranty of merchantability with regard to a specific defect in a product where the consumer was informed
of the defect before consummation of the sale contract and the defect
became the basis of the bargain. This limitation is not effective, however, if the consumer suffers either personal injury or property damage
79
as a result of the defect.
In 1973, Maine expanded the coverage of its adoption of U.C.C. § 2316 by adding a specific paragraph to protect the consumer. The statute
states that the provisions of § 2-316 regarding disclaimers of implied
warranties shall not apply to consumer goods and services, and that any
attempt to exclude or modify such implied warranties will be unenforceable in sales of consumer goods.80
In 1971, Maryland enacted a provision in its Commercial Law Code
that provides that U.C.C. § 2-316 is inapplicable to the sale of consumer
goods or services. The section further states that any disclaimers of implied warranties or remedies for breach of warranty are unenforceable
in such sales.8 '
Similarly, Massachusetts in 1970 enacted a provision preempting
U.C.C. § 2-316 with respect to consumer goods and services. That section provides that no attempt to exclude or modify implied warranties
82
or remedies for their breach will be enforceable.
The Minnesota Consumer Warranties statutes,8 3 enacted in 1973,
84
closely parallel the California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.
Both statutes allow disclaimers of implied warranties only if the products are clearly sold "as is" and a conspicuous writing containing specific statutory conditions of notice is present.8 5 The Minnesota statute
goes further than the California statute, however, by prohibiting limitations on the duration of implied warranties if the seller makes an ex75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 1791.1(c).
KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 50-623 to -644 (1983).

Id. § 50-623(c).
Id. § 50-639.
Id. § 50-639(c).

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1983).
81. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975 & Supp. 1983).
82. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1982).
83. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.17-.20 (West Supp. 1981).

84. See supra notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text.
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.18 (West Supp. 1981).
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86
press warranty arising out of a consumer sale of new goods.
In 1966, the Mississippi legislature repealed U.C.C. § 2-316, but retained U.C.C. § 2-719. The repeal of U.C.C. § 2-316 was intended to
render all disclaimers of the implied warranties7 of merchantability and
8
fitness for a particular purpose unenforceable.
In 1971, Vermont added a paragraph to U.C.C. § 2-316 with results
comparable to Maine's statute.8 8 The addition provides that U.C.C. § 2316 disclaimers of implied warranties shall not apply to new or unused
attempts to exclude or modify such
consumer goods or services, and any
89
warranties will be unenforceable.
In 1974, Washington amended U.C.C. § 2-316 to provide that disclaimers of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are ineffective in consumer transactions unless the
disclaimer specifically identifies the qualities and characteristics not
warranted. 9° Thus, the Washington approach recognizes disclaimers of
implied warranties as long as they are specific.
Finally, West Virginia in 1974 enacted a General Consumer Protection Act.9 1 Section 46A-6-107 provides that "no merchant shall (1) exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit any warranty, express or
implied ... or (2) exclude, modify or attempt to limit any remedy pro'92
vided by law."

3. Summary of Warranty Protection
It is apparent from this overview that the U.C.C. affords little protection to consumers in cases where merchants and manufacturers
make no express warranties, clearly disclaim all implied warranties,
and exclude consequential damages. Since manufacturers of computer
programs typically make use of disclaimer provisions, 93 the U.C.C. offers little protection to the software purchaser. Although disclaimers
and exclusions can be attacked as unconscionable, it is up to the courts
to invoke this doctrine to provide the consumer with compensation.
Federal legislation is also of little help in assisting the consumer in
his battle. Even though the Magnuson-Moss Act disallows disclaimers
of implied warranties, this prohibition applies only in cases where an
express warranty is offered. Computer programs do not purport to offer warranties of any kind.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. § 325G.19(1).
House Bill No. 977 1976 Miss. Laws 517.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1984).

90. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-316 (Supp. 1984).

91. W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6-101 to -108 (1980).
92. Id. § 46A-6-107.
93. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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It appears, therefore, that unless a program purchaser is fortunate
enough to live in one of the few states where disclaimers of implied
warranties are not allowed regardless of the existence of express warranties,94 he will have difficulty pursuing a cause of action under a warranty theory unless he can claim that such disclaimers are
unconscionable.
Breach of warranty, however, is not the only avenue of relief available to the consumer. The law of torts might also apply when a consumer is damaged by a defective computer program. The following
section addresses the current state of these tort remedies.
B.

TORTS

Since the tort law compensates a party for the violation of duties
imposed by operation of law rather than those assumed consensually,
contractual disclaimers do not bar recovery in tort. The consumer who
pursues recovery under tort theories, however, often faces rigid burden
of proof requirements regarding the product's defects. Three theories
of tortious liability-negligence, strict products liability, and misrepresentation-will be discussed herein, with the analysis focusing primarily
on their application to actions involving defective computer programs.
1.

Negligence

Under common law principles of negligence, plaintiffs must successfully prove causation, duty of care, breach of duty and proximate
causation in order to prevail. When these requirements are applied to
litigation involving computer programs, the novelty and sophistication
of the programs present courts with difficult questions regarding adequacy of proof and standards of care. Each of these elements and the
problems they may present to courts in the computer program context
are discussed below.
a. Causation: Initially, the consumer must prove that but for a de95
fect in the program the damage would not have occurred. If the plaintiff fails to meet this "but for" causation requirement, liability will be
precluded. This requirement is, in some respects, probably the easiest
hurdle the consumer has to overcome. For example, if a program was
purchased to regulate the humidity of a home and the program's malfunction damaged the home, the consumer would only need to prove
that the failure of the program was the cause of the damage. Although
the plaintiff may have to show that the source of the defect was in the
94. Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Vermont, and West Virginia
all prohibit such disclaimers.
95. See, e.g., New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920).
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program 96rather than in the computer itself, this should not be
difficult.
b. Duty of care: Once it has been established that the program
was the cause of the damage, the plaintiff must then prove that the
manufacturer owed a duty of care to the consumer. This is a fairly
straightforward requirement that is ordinarily not difficult for the consumer to meet. Common law principles of negligence recognize that a
manufacturer owes a duty of care to the consumer. 97 There are, however, different standards of care, 98 and the courts must decide what
standard a manufacturer of computer programs should be required to
meet. Some commentators have suggested that programmers should be
held to a professional standard of care, 99 or to that degree of care exercised by a reasonable member of the profession under similar circumstances.10° The relatively recent development of the computer industry,
however, presents a problem in defining the standard of professional
duty that programmers should be required to meet. Programmers are
not required to be licensed,' 0 ' and the industry has not established any
guidelines or regulations.' 0 2 The continued growth of the industry,
however, is likely to lead to customary industry practices, allowing
courts to look to industry standards to establish a level of duty commensurate with that of other computer program manufacturers.
c. Breach of duty: After it has been established that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to the consumer, the consumer must next
prove that the manufacturer breached that duty. This is the most difficult element for the plaintiff to prove. Again, the relative youth of the
computer industry prevents courts from adequately relying on trade
03
custom and usage to determine whether a duty has been breached.
For example, if a consumer argues that the manufacturer negligently
failed to adequately test a program, the courts must then decide how
96. See Comment, supra note 4, at 441 n.6 ("[Qiften the nature of the accident itself
will demonstrate the program's defectiveness.").
97. See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Young, 116 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1940).
98. See, e.g., Titus v. Bradford Etc. R.R. Co., 136 Pa. 618, 20 A. 517 (1890).
99. Prosser defines "professionals" as "those who undertake any work calling for special skill [who] are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also

to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 161 (4th ed. 1971).
100. See, e.g., Nycum, supra note 22, at 9; Jordon, The Tortious Computer: When Does

E.D.P.
(1972).
101.
102.
103.

Become Errant Data Processing? 4 COMPUTER L. SERV. (Callaghan) § 5-1, Art. 2
See 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. (Callaghan) § 7-3 (1974).
See Gemignani, supra note 7, at 190.
See Nycum, supra note 22, at 11.
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much testing is required. Since programmers are not required to follow
any codes of professional conduct and no industry standards have been
established, courts cannot rely on common practices of others in the industry, and consequently have little guidance. Further, the complex nature of, and lack of familiarity with, the industry makes this task even
more difficult.
Another problem in proving breach of duty is found in isolating the
defect and determining whether this defect was the result of a negligent
act. A plaintiff may, for example, be required to isolate the individual
error to determine whether or not the mistake was the result of a
programmer's negligence. 1° 4 In the consumer context the difficulty of
determining the cause of the error will often prevent the consumer
from prevailing in a negligence cause of action.
The law offers a possible shortcut for the plaintiff faced with this
difficulty, provided that certain requirements are met. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which means literally "the act speaks for itself," may
be applied in cases where the injury would not normally occur in the
absence of negligence. If the doctrine is successfully invoked, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, who must then rebut the presumption that it has breached its duty of care. Commentators have agreed,
however, that it is not likely that this doctrine would be applied by
courts to program malfunctions due to the current state of the art of
computer technology.' 0 5 This conclusion is based on their reasoning
that one cannot yet say with assurance that errors do not occur in the
°
computer industry in the absence of negligence.'0
d. Proximate cause: Under common law principles of negligence,
the consumer's injury must result from the program's defect.10 7 This
causal connection is not in and of itself, however, sufficient to invoke
negligence liability. 08 The negligent act must also be the "proximate
1°9
cause" of the injury.
Although there is no uniform method used to determine whether
the proximate cause requirement has been satisfied, a general question
often asked by courts is whether the injury was the direct and natural
result of the negligent act, and was not affected by intervening circum104. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4, at 441.
105. See, e.g., Gemignani, supra note 7, at 191; Jordan, supra note 100, at 8; Nycum,

supra note 22, at 11.
106. See Jordan, supra note 100, at 8.
107. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
108. Alabama Power Co. v. Bass, 218 Ala. 586, 119 So. 625 (1928); Lemos v. Madden, 28
Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791 (1921).
109. Kryger v. Panaszy, 123 Conn. 353, 195 A. 795 (1937), Gilman v. Central Vt. Ry. Co.,
93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122 (1919).
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stances. 110 Thus, if a defect was only remotely connected with the harm
caused, the proximate cause requirement may not be satisfied.
e. Defenses to a negligence cause of action: Even if the consumer
successfully proves that the manufacturer was negligent in developing
the program, the manufacturer has several defenses. Contributory negligence11 ' or assumption of risk, 1 2 for example, might be available, and
if successfully proven by the manufacturer, can relieve him of all or
part of his liability.
It is apparent from the preceding overview that a negligence cause
of action, laden as it is with problems of proof, can present special
problems with respect to defective computer programs. Although strict
liability alleviates some of the problems present in negligence actions,
this avenue also presents the consumer with a difficult route to
recovery.
2. Strict Products Liability
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that
one who sells any product"13 in a defective condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property shall be subject to liability regardless of the amount of care the seller has
exercised. 1 14 The American Law Institute adopted section 402A in order to free the consumer from the warranty disclaimers provided by the
U.C.C. The strict liability doctrine has not developed into the ultimate
consumer remedy some of its supporters envisoned, however. 115 The
primary problem many consumers encounter with the doctrine is the
courts' hesitation to apply it to those cases where plaintiffs have suffered only economic losses. Although some jurisdictions have applied
110. Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
ill. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
112. Id. § 496A.
113. The term "product" presents a definitional problem similar to that previously addressed in connection with the U.C.C. See supra text accompanying notes 11-24. Specifically, the question is whether courts will allow a mass-marketed computer program,
which possesses characteristics of both a service and a product, to be considered a "product" in a strict liability cause of action. For two reasons, this Note assumes that they will.
First, the policy motivations underlying the enforcement of strict liability indicate that it
is appropriate for mass-marketed programs to be considered "products." See Note, supra
note 4, at 855. Second, both the retail popularity and the tangible characteristics of the
program lead one to conclude that such programs are better thought of as "goods." See
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
114. Section 402A, adopted in 1965, has been enacted either judicially or legislatively
by all but six states. See Note, Strict Liability and Warranty in Consumer Protection:
The Broader Protection of the U.CC. in Cases Involving Economic Loss, Used Goods, and

Nondangerous Defective Goods, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1352 nn.39, 40 (1982).
115. See Note, supra note 114, at 1347.
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strict liability to cases in which the consumer has been harmed only ecto apply the doctrine unless the
onomically, i i 6 the majority refuse
17
plaintiff is physically harmed.'
The courts' reluctance to extend the strict liability doctrine can be
attributed in part to a general tendency to perceive recovery of economic losses as being contractual by nature, and recovery in tort as beAdditionally, some
ing essentially limited to physical injury."i 8
commentators believe that the application of strict liability to economic
losses would deprive the seller of the opportunity to negotiate the allocation of risks with the buyer." 9
Damages resulting from defective programs used in home computers will often consist only of economic losses. Consequently, a consumer who purchases such programs will likely, in most jurisdictions,
encounter courts unwilling to apply strict liability to allow recovery of
such losses. Assuming, however, that the court is willing to allow recovery based on strict liability, the consumer is faced with yet another
hurdle. The consumer must prove that the product is defective and that
manufacturer
the defect is so dangerous to the consumer that the
120
should be held strictly liable for the resulting damages.
Section 402A provides that a manufacturer should be held strictly
liable for his product only if it is "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer."1 21 Thus, the consumer must prove
not only that the seller was responsible for the product's defect, but also
22
that the defect caused the product to be unreasonably dangerous.'
Although most courts follow the requirements of section 402A,123 some
have lightened the plaintiff's burden of proof requirements. California,
for example, no longer requires the consumer to prove that the product
was unreasonably dangerous, reasoning that such a requirement is apApp. 3d 136, 139-46, 414
116. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill.
N.E.2d 1302, 1306-11 (1980) (damages for loss of profits due to defective storage tank recoverable under strict liability); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., Inc.,
72 Wis. 2d 38, 44-45, 240 N.W.2d 124, 127-28 (1976) (cost of making repairs on defective roof
recoverable under strict liability).
117. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 17-18, 515 P.2d 41, 44-45 (1973)
(buyer of defective diesel truck could not recover economic losses under strict liability
theory); Henderson v. General Motors Corp. 152 Ga. App. 63, 64, 262 S.E.2d 238, 239.40
(1979) (buyer of car could not recover economic loss under strict liability theory).
118. See Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the

UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?,42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 142 (1974).
119. See, e.g., Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L.

REv.309, 318, 327 (1973).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTs § 402A (1965).
121. Id.
122. Id., comment i.
123. See, e.g., Byrns v. Riddell, Inc. 113 Ariz. 264, 266, 550 P.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1976) (en
banc); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Okla. 1974).
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propriate in a negligence action, but not in a products liability suit. 124
Although purchasers of defective programs may experience difficulty meeting the damage and proof requirements for strict liability, the
policy considerations that spawned the concept of strict liability-loss
spreading, victim compensation and accident cost reduction125-do provide the consumer with a compelling argument that strict liability
should be applied to suppliers of computer programs. It can be argued
that computer companies are better able than consumers to spread the
loss of damages, either by buying insurance 126 or by adjusting prices.
Computer companies may also be in a better financial position to compensate individual consumers for their losses. Perhaps the most compelling argument, however, is that strict liability will provide the
industry with incentives to improve future products. If the industry
knows that it will be strictly liable for its defective products, it will allow time for proper testing which will reduce the likelihood of potential
defects in programs in the future.
A consumer filing a strict liability action would also have to overcome various defenses. Two defenses that are recognized in strict liability cases are product misuse12 7 and assumption of risk.128 In addition,
courts have precluded the application of strict liability if the danger
posed was unavoidable due to the current state of the art at the time of
129
manufacture.
3.

Tortious Misrepresentation

The two preceding sections discussed tort theories based upon errors in the design or manufacture of the product in question. Another
possible theory may be available to the consumer if a misrepresentation
concerning the attributes or capabilities of the product is made. U.C.C.
§ 2-721 specifically recognizes the possibility of recovery for misrepresentation apart from any recovery for breach of warranty.1 30 At least
124. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972)
(en banc). Although some other jurisdictions have followed California's lead, most have
rejected this reasoning and continue to require plaintiffs to prove that products are unreasonably dangerous.
125. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
126. See Freed, ProductsLiability in the ComputerAge, 12 FORUM 461, 477 (1977).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965) provides: "A product
is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the
injury results from abnormal handling... the seller is not liable."
128. See Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415

U.S. 932 (1974).
129. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp. 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976).
130. U.C.C. § 2-721 (1977) provides: "Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud
include all remedies available under this Article for non-fraudulent breach. Neither re-
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three varieties of tortious misrepresentation have been recognized by
the courts. They are intentional fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and innocent misrepresentation.
a. Intentional fraud: Intentional fraud requires a showing that
the vendor made an intentionally false statement of material fact reasonably relied upon by the vendee to his detriment. 131 Mere "puffing"
132
or predictions as to future performance, however, are not actionable.
Moreover, if the contract explicitly states a fact completely contrary to
the claimed misrepresentations, the plantiff will33 be prevented from
i
demonstrating the necessary element of reliance.
b. Negligent and innocent misrepresentation: Some jurisdictions
have recognized two additional causes of action for tortious misrepresentation, negligent and innocent misrepresentation. Most courts, however, are persuaded by the argument that such unintentional
misrepresentations are not actionable in transactions where a warranty
has been disclaimed, since the recognition of such actions would defeat
the purpose of the contractual disclaimer. In Call v. Computer Data
General Corp.,134 for example, where a negligent misrepresentation
claim was made, the judge stated:
The court is of the opinion that this cause of action cannot stand. To
allow it to remain and to sanction its validity would in essence render
the provision of Section 2-316 of the Commercial Code insofar as they
permit a disclaimer of warranties a nullity ....

[I]t is unlikely that

warranties pursuparties could ever effectively agree to a disclaimer of
135
ant to Section 2-316 if such a pleading was allowed.
c. Misrepresentation theories as applied to computer vendors:
Notwithstanding the specific recognition of misrepresentation causes of
action provided by U.C.C. § 2-721, courts have been reluctant to allow
disappointed computer users to circumvent contractual terms by resorting to such theories.' 36 Moreover, in the consumer context, there is litscission or a claim for rescission of the contract for sale nor rejection or return of the
goods shall bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or other remedy."
131. See Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 46 (D.S.C.
1974).
132. See Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 925 (E.D. Wis. 1977),
affd mem, 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978).
133. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 179 (8th Cir. 1971).
134. No. 409415 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Santa Clara Co., March 11, 1980).
135. Id. But see Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.
1971).
136. See, e.g., Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C.

1974); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan)
438, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293 (Mass.Super. Ct. 1977).
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tle likelihood of misrepresentations being made since bargaining and
negotiating for such products is not the normal method of practice.
III.
A.

CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING LAW

INADEQUACY OF CURRENT LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE PURCHASE
OF HOME COMPUTER PROGRAMS

Although the U.C.C. offers broad protections from both economic
and physical injury to the consumer who purchases a defective product
by imposing implied warranties on the seller1 3 7 and providing statutory
remedies for the buyer,1 38 the impact of these warranties and remedies
is severely weakened by the seller's right to disclaim them. Since the
U.C.C. allows the seller to disclaim implied warranties and exclude consequential damages 139 for products, the seller who complies with the
statutory requirements for such disclaimers may be effectively relieved
of all warranty liability.
By hiring attorneys adept at disclaimer draftmanship, the sellers of
computer programs are able to avoid all warranty liability. Since the
seller clearly brings to the consumer's attention the fact that the program is being sold "as is," these disclaimers are not considered to be
misleading. Nonetheless, the consumer is forced to accept the terms of
these contractual provisions if he chooses to buy the program. If the
program eventually proves defective, and the consumer chooses to litigate under a contract theory, the consumer must argue that the contract was unconscionable.' 40 Since the terms of such contracts are
permitted by statute in most states, however, it is difficult for the consumer to prevail in such actions.
Congress has recognized the consumer's disadvantage resulting
from the U.C.C. disclaimer provisions and has enacted the Magnuson4
Moss Act to restrict the seller's use of implied warranty disclaimers.' '
The Act takes effect, however, only after the manufacturer has voluntarily made an express warranty.' 42 As a result, sellers of computer programs are able to circumvent further restrictions on their use of such
disclaimers by simply refusing to make warranties of any kind. Ironically, the Act has had the effect of further discouraging the use of warranties by manufacturers, rather than broadening the consumer's
protections.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text.
notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
note 64 and accompanying text.
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Consumer warranty legislation in California 1 43 and Minnesota'"
has, to a great extent, paralleled the Magnuson-Moss Act. In those
states, sellers are able to circumvent the protective efforts of the legislation simply by failing to make any express warranties and clearly indicating that the products are being sold "as is." Alabama 145 has gone
somewhat further than California and Minnesota by refusing to allow
sellers to exclude liability for damages for personal injury resulting
from consumer goods. This legislation has had only minimal effect on
warranty actions resulting from defective home computer programs,
however, since most of these buyers suffer only economic or property
damages.
The only states that have by legislation chosen not to recognize the
disclaimers of warranty typically included in computer program contracts are Kansas, 146 Maine, 147 Maryland, 148 Massachusetts, 14 9 Mississippi,' 50 Vermont' 5 ' and West Virginia. 5 2 These states generally
accomplish this by amending U.C.C. § 2-316 to prohibit any disclaimers
of implied warranties or remedies for breach of warranty in the sale of
consumer products. Mississippi has gone the furthest by disallowing
such disclaimers in both consumer and commercial contexts.
The purchaser of a home computer program is able to avoid the effect of warranty disclaimers by relying on tort theories, but this may be
an equally difficult route to recovery. Often, the cost and effort of such
litigation will outweigh the damages suffered.
In negligence actions, strict burden of proof requirements present
consumers with a considerable hurdle to overcome.' 5 3 Although strict
liability to some extent relieves the consumer of these requirements,
that doctrine is generally only applied to non-economic losses' 54 and inherently dangerous products, 55 and therefore does not provide a cause
of action for defective computer programs in most jurisdictions. Tortious misrepresentation also fails to provide a viable cause of action on
account of the courts' reluctance to recognize such actions in the computer program context and the likelihood that such misrepresentations
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
supra notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text.
supra notes 91 & 92 and accompanying text.
supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
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would not be made in the context of consumer purchases of off-theshelf goods.15
In sum, the difficulty of proving harm caused by a defective computer program, the fact that most defective programs will not cause the
consumer exorbitant damages, and the likelihood that most consumers
will be initially deterred from litigating in the face of blatant contractual disclaimers all indicate that, in most cases, sellers will be able to
successfully avoid liability for damages resulting from their defective
programs.
B.

FURTHER STEPS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE CONSUMER

The law as it now stands allows the seller in most states, absent a
successful tort or unconscionability claim by the buyer, to effectively
shift the risk of defective products to the consumer. As a result, purchasers of consumer programs are not provided with any assurances or
guarantees of quality and safety for the products they purchase. This
can be troublesome for consumers, since they often rely on the capabilities of computer programs to protect their homes from burglaries and
fires, control the humidity in their homes, and carry out important computations for investment, business and tax purposes.
In business settings, purchasers of computer programs often have
the opportunity to negotiate the allocation of risks. Furthermore, programs are often tailored to meet the specific needs of business purchasers. Consumers, however, are forced to accept the terms of contracts as
set forth by the supplier for their programs. Since the program manufacturer produces and duplicates a single program to be used by many
computer owners, it is in a better position than the consumer to bear
the burden of anticipating and controlling the risks with respect to the
performance of the product. The seller is also in a better position financially to bear the burden of injury costs caused by defective programs.
The seller can distribute these costs by purchasing insurance and, if
necessary, by increasing the price of its programs. Shifting the burden
of liability to the seller would also have the effect of enhancing the
quality of programs by encouraging adequate testing by the seller
before marketing. In the consumer context, therefore, it is more equitable and efficient for the burden of liability for defective programs to be
borne by the seller.
IV. PROPOSAL
Although several states have been successful in enacting legislation
to prohibit the sale of "as is" consumer products, this protection is
156. See supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
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piecemeal. In order to effectively shift the burden of bearing the risk of
defective products to the seller, uniform legislative action is required.
Congress must recognize that the Magnuson-Moss Act has failed to adequately protect the consumer who purchases home computer programs,
and that this failure directly contravenes strong public policy favoring
consumer protection and manufacturer responsibility. Consumer warranty legislation that would prevent the seller from making disclaimers
of implied warranties would go far in furthering the goal of adequate
consumer protection.
In light of the foregoing, Congress should amend the MagnusonMoss Act to prohibit consumer software manufacturers from disclaiming implied warranties and remedies, including consequential damages,
regardless of whether a full or limited express warranty has been made
under the terms of the Act. Such an amendment would require sellers
to provide consumers with adequate protection by providing buyers of
computer programs with assurance that the goods are suitable for their
intended purposes. If the products fail to adequately perform their intended function, the seller rather than the buyer would be responsible
for resulting damages.
CONCLUSION
Consumers must be provided with minimal guarantees for the quality and safety of the programs they purchase for their computers. The
state of the art of the industry is no longer an excuse that manufacturers should be able to hide behind to escape liability for defective products. Computers are no longer experimental pieces of equipment, but
rather are products sold as everyday appliances relied upon by the consumer to perform routine tasks. The expansion of the market resulting
from the increasing popularity of such items enables sellers to bear the
burden of adequately testing such programs to ensure their quality.
Although several states have recognized the need to protect the
consumer by prohibiting sellers of consumer products from disclaiming
implied warranties, a uniform nationwide legislation that protects the
consumer will ensure that the market will function more equitably and
efficiently for all concerned.
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